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LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT

OCT 19 2012 5

JOHN 1/2. CLARKE, CLERK BY E. VERNER, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Lynne Spears

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE\STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

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SAM LUTFI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

VS.

12 | LYNNE IRENE SPEARS, an individual, JAMES PARNELL SPEARS, an | individual, BRITNEY JEAN SPEARS, an individual; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. BC 406904

DEFENDANT LYNNE SPEARS' TRIAL BRIEF RE: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Trial: October 2, 2012

Time: 10:00 am

Dept.: 71

Action Filed: Trial Date:

February 3, 2009 October 1, 2012

Defendant Lynne Spears hereby respectfully submits this Trial Brief regarding Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") Cause of Action.

Since the IIED claim is redundant to Plaintiff's Defamation claim (and also requires proof of additional elements) it should be dismissed. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to timely submit any Proposed Jury Instructions on his IIED claim. Finally, if and to the extent that Plaintiff fails in his Opening Statement to set forth facts which would make a prima facie case for IIED, a judgment of nonsuit should be granted.

## 1. Since the IIED Claim is Redundant to Plaintiff's Defamation Claim (and Also Requires Proof of Additional Elements) a Nonsuit Should be Granted.

In Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal.3d 1033 (1986), the plaintiff, an author of a novel, brought an action against a newspaper based upon the newspaper's failure to include the novel on

its best seller list. The plaintiff asserted negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, negligence, trade libel and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The California Supreme Court held that the lower court's judgment of dismissal of these claims was proper. It found that these causes of action had as their gravamen the alleged injurious falsehood of the best seller list and hence were required to satisfy the First Amendment requirements. See id. at 1044–48. It stated: "Although the limitations that define the First Amendment's zone of protection for the press were established in defamation actions, they are not peculiar to such actions but apply to all claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement: '[t]hat constitutional protection does not depend on the label given the stated cause of action' [citation], and no cause of action 'can claim ... talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations' [citations]."Id. at 1042–43.

The Court further recognized that First Amendment limitations are applicable to all claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement because "[i]f these limitations applied only to actions denominate 'defamation,' they would furnish little if any protection to free-speech and free-press values," and plaintiffs would simply affix a label other than "defamation" to their claims. *Id.* at 1045.

This reasoning applies with equal force here. While Plaintiff may attempt to label his additional cause of action as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the gravamen of his claim remains the alleged injurious falsehood of the Book. Flynn v Higham (1983) 149 Cal App 3d 677, 681 (labeling claim as IIED added nothing to claim for Defamation). Since the IIED claim is entirely redundant to the Defamation claim, the IIED is superfluous and should be dismissed.

## 2. Plaintiff Failed to Timely Submit Any Proposed Jury Instructions on His IIED Claim in Violation of Code of Civil Procedure Section 607a

Code of Civil Procedure Section 607a expressly provides that: "In every case which is being tried before the court with a jury, it shall be the duty of counsel for the respective parties, before the first witness is sworn, to deliver to the judge presiding at the trial and serve upon opposing counsel, all proposed instructions to the jury covering the law as disclosed by the pleadings. Thereafter, and before the commencement of the argument, counsel may deliver to such judge, and serve upon opposing counsel, additional proposed instructions to the jury upon questions of law developed by the evidence and not disclosed by the pleadings."

Prior to calling his first witness Plaintiff failed to serve and deliver to the Court any jury instructions regarding his IIED claim in violation of C.C.P. Section 607a.

3. If and to the Extent Plaintiff Fails in His Opening Statement to Set Forth Facts Which Would Make a Prima Facie Case for IIED, a Nonsuit Should be Granted.

If and to the extent that Plaintiff fails in his Opening Statement to set forth facts which would make a prima facie case for IIED, a judgment of nonsuit should be granted pursuant to C.C.P. Section 581c. Jensen v Hewlett-Packard Co (1993) 14 CA 4th 958, 965 (judgment of nonsuit granted in defamation case after Plaintiff's opening statement failed to set forth facts sufficient to sustain cause of action). Where, as here, the First Amendment is involved, a judgment of nonsuit is a favored remedy. Id.

To prove a claim for IIED, the Plaintiff would have to show:

- 1. "Outrageous conduct" which is conduct so extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. Conduct is outrageous if a reasonable person would regard the conduct as intolerable in a civilized community. Outrageous conduct does not include trivialities such as indignities, annoyances, hurt feelings, or bad manners that a reasonable person is expected to endure. CACI 1602.
- 2. Emotional distress includes suffering, anguish, fright, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and shame caused by the defendant's conduct. "Severe emotional distress" is not mild or brief; it must be so substantial or long lasting that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to bear it. CACI 1604.

To the extent that Plaintiff fails in his Opening Statement to set forth facts which would make a prima facie case for IIED, a judgment of nonsuit should be granted pursuant to C.C.P. Section 581c.

Dated: October 18, 2012

ROHDE & VICTOROFF

Respectfully

Stephen F. Rohde Attorneys for Defendant Lynne Spears

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